Adversarial training is the most successful empirical method, to increase the robustness of neural networks against adversarial attacks yet. Unfortunately, this higher robustness is accompanied by considerably higher computational complexity. To date, only adversarial training with expensive multi-step adversarial attacks like Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) proved effective against equally strong attacks. In this paper, we present two ideas that combined enable adversarial training with the computationally less expensive Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). First, we add uniform noise to the initial data point of the FGSM attack, which creates a wider variety of stronger adversaries. Further, we add a learnable regularization step prior to the neural network called Stochastic Augmentation Layer (SAL). Inputs propagated trough the SAL are resampled from a Gaussian distribution. The randomness of the resampling at inference time makes it more complicated for the attacker to construct an adversarial example since the outcome of the model is not known in advance. We show that noise injection in conjunction with FGSM adversarial training achieves comparable results to adversarial training with PGD while being orders of magnitude faster. Moreover, we show superior results in comparison to PGD-based training when combining noise injection and SAL.
Introduction
Deep learning has led to breakthroughs in various fields, such as computer vision [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] , language processing [van den Oord et al., 2016] , and reinforcement learning [Mnih et al., 2013] . However, the deployment of deep learning models in real-world applications is currently limited by their vulnerability to small adversarial perturbations. Their approximation ability [Hornik et al., 1989] comes with hard interpretability and counter-intuitive properties [Szegedy et al., 2014] . It has been shown that small perturbations to the input of a neural network can lead to misclassification [Szegedy et al., 2014] . These perturbations are found with optimization methods and are called adversarial examples [Szegedy et al., 2014] . The magnitude of these perturbations is generally bounded by a value for a given norm (e.g., l ∞ , l 2 ) [Goodfellow et al., 2015] . Thereby, it is guaranteed that the perturbation is in a reasonable range, and the actual class label is unchanged.
Making neural networks robust to adversarial examples is still an unsolved problem. In a constant challenge between new adversarial attacks and defenses, most of the proposed defenses have shown to be ineffective [Xie et al., 2017; Uesato et al., 2018] . One particularly successful approach to increase the adversarial robustness of a model is adversarial training [Goodfellow et al., 2015] . This method augments the training data with adversarial examples until the model learns to classify them correctly. Here, the robustness of the model against adversarial attacks is strongly dependent on the adversarial attack used to train the model. In the past, mainly computational expensive multi-step adversarial attacks such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), have been proven effective for adversarial training [Madry et al., 2018] . Less expensive one-step attacks, such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), have shown to be insufficient [Kurakin et al., 2018] , providing no adversarial robustness against stronger attacks.
In this paper, we propose a method that involves two successive steps, that combined enable fast and stable adversarial training based on the FGSM attack. First, we aim to find stronger perturbations with the FGSM attack by adding noise in the range of the adversarial perturbation to the initial data point. Since the perturbation budget of the adversarial attack is limited around the noisy data point rather than the original, a wider variety of adversaries is generated. In turn, the network is less likely to overfit to the FGSM attack. Secondly, we improve the adversarial robustness of a neural network by including a learnable data augmentation process called Stochastic Augmentation Layer (SAL). The SAL resamples the input features of a neural network from a Gaussian distribution before passing them to the next layer. The mean vector of this distribution is given by the input features, and the variance is calculated by the SAL. In the resampling process, the adversarial perturbation is weakened, which improves the robustness of the model and increases the stability of FGSM-based training. We utilize the reparameterization trick to update the parameters of the SAL through backpropagation along with the other parameters of the neural network. The contributions of this paper are the following: • We find that adversarial training using a standard implementation of FGSM gives competitive results when noise in the range of the adversarial perturbation is injected during the training process. This makes adversarial training orders of magnitude faster compared to training with the PGD method. • We propose a form of learnable data augmentation called Stochastic Augmentation Layer, which prevents overfitting of FGSM-based training and increases the adversarial robustness of neural networks. Further, we show that it acts as a regularization method that can be applied independently from adversarial training.
Related Work
With the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), [Goodfellow et al., 2015] proposed an efficient way to construct adversarial examples with one gradient step and used them for the first iteration of adversarial training. In subsequent work, variants of the FGSM have been developed, which find stronger adversaries by making multiple smaller gradient decent steps [Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2018] . Networks trained with FGSM adversarial training proved to be vulnerable to those attacks, which made FGSM-based training insufficient, whereas the multi-step Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method introduced by [Madry et al., 2018] showed to be an effective way of training robust neural networks against multi-step attacks. However, the computational complexity of PGD training is orders of magnitudes higher depending on the number of steps used to find the optimal perturbation. To circumvent the increased computational complexity of PGD training, recent work tried to make FGSM-based training feasible. [Kurakin et al., 2018] showed that curvature artifacts around the original data point can mask the true gradient direction, which prevents the FGSM attack from finding a use full perturbation. Their modification of the FGSM called R+FGSM partially solved this problem by randomly initializing the starting point within a hypercube in the perturbation budget. Yet, their method only provided little robustness against multi-step attacks. [Wong et al., 2020] improved upon this idea by choosing a random starting point within the whole perturbation budget. This enabled adversarial training with FGSM to achieve competitive adversarial robustness compared to PGD-based training. Nevertheless, their approach only works with specific step sizes of the FGSM attack and is sensitive to the network architecture. Further, it can lead to sudden overfitting to the FGSM attack and needs an early stopping routine that monitors the accuracy against PGD attacks. We will call this approach RFGSM in the following.
In addition to adversarial training, a variety of other defense measures have been proposed. An important branch of these methods uses random perturbations to weaken the effect of adversarial attacks He et al., 2019] . Most of them are based on noise injection, where noise from the same Gaussian distribution is added to each feature in a layer. The parameters of the distribution were either tuneable hyperparameters [Liu et al., 2018] or learned with backpropagation He et al., 2019] . Intuitively, the presence of noise at the inference time of the neural network makes it more complicated to design an adversarial example, as the attacker does not know the specific noise when generating the adversarial perturbation. This intuition is supported by theoretical work. [Matsuoka, 1992] showed that injecting noise during the training phase of a neural network reduces the sensitivity of the network to small input perturbations. Furthermore, showed that noise injection from an exponential family increases the adversarial robustness of neural networks.
Adversarial Attacks
Constructing an adversarial perturbation r can be described by the following optimization problem:
where X and Y are pairs of samples in a classification task, L is a suitable loss function (e.g., categorical cross-entropy), and F θ is a neural network parameterized by θ. The manner in which the perturbation r is found depends on the specific type of adversarial attack. The biggest group of adversarial attacks is gradient-based. These attacks exploit the gradient information of models to construct the optimal adversarial perturbation. The gradient information can be either taken by the model itself (white-box attack) or by a similar model (black-box attack). The black-box attack can be used if the target model is obfuscating its gradients, and the attack is dependent on the gradient information. Nevertheless, it can not be guaranteed that the gradient information of the black-box model is useful for generating adversarial examples for the target model. Alternatively, a gradient-free method like Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) can be used, to confirm that the target model is not achieving adversarial robustness trough gradient obfuscation [Uesato et al., 2018] . SPSA approximates the gradient numerically by searching in multiple random directions for the steepest descent and is, therefore, independent on the gradient information of the model. Regardless of the method, adversarial examples are always limited in their magnitude by a given norm (e.g., L p ). This ensures that the adversarial example still reflects the original class. Adversarial attacks are additionally grouped by their goal. The latter can either consist in causing any kind of misclassification (untargeted) or in causing the model to predict a particular target class (targeted).
Noise Augmented Adversarial Training
Current research by [Wong et al., 2020] showed that adversarial robustness against PGD attacks can be achieved with RFGSM-based training with only small adjustments made to the initial FGSM formulation. We propose a similar idea and augment the training data with uniform noise before applying the FGSM attack. In comparison to the method proposed in [Wong et al., 2020] , FGSM with noise injection can generate stronger adversaries since the attacks are bounded not by the original value but rather by the noisy input. The injected noise moves the perturbation boundary of the FGSM attack, which leads to a larger variety of adversarial examples. In turn, the network is less likely to overfit to the FGSM attack. The difference between vanilla FGSM, R+FGSM, RFGSM, and our method is summarized in Figure 2 . For the sake of simplicity, we will call FGSM-based training with noise injection noisy FGSM in the following. The potential starting point of the attack (blue dot) is given by the light blue region. The gradient direction of the FGSM is shown by a dotted line and the optimal adversarial perturbation by a star at the adversarial perturbation limit (solid black line).
Stochastic Augmentation Layer
To prevent the network from overfitting against the FGSM attack, we introduce a learnable data augmentation process called Stochastic Augmentation Layer (SAL) that can be included in any neural network. Let us consider X i ∈ R n as the i th sample of the input distribution X described by its
for every input feature and uses them to calculate the variance Σ i for the respective input according to Equation 2. With the calculated variance, the output of the SAL Y i is computed by sampling new values for each feature from a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1) with zero mean and unit variance, as shown in Equation 3.
(2)
The functionality of the SAL is illustrated in Figure 1 . The reparameterization trick enables the network to update the weights and biases of the SAL with backpropagation along with the other layers [Kingma and Welling, 2014] . Contrary to prior approaches [Liu et al., 2018] [He et al., 2019] we learn a variance for every feature of the input with the SAL, instead of applying identical Gaussian noise to the features. Unlike the method proposed by , our method can be used as a regularization method apart from adversarial training with the regular categorical cross-entropy loss function. Note that [Athalye et al., 2018] showed that architectures that apply a random transformation to the input during inference time should be evaluated with regard to the expectation of their output. The reparameterization trick makes the Monte Carlo estimate of the expectation of the output of the SAL differentiable. This allows us to correctly compute the adversarial attack with respect to the expectation of the sampling procedure. The SAL can be easily implemented in any common Deep Learning framework by following equations 2 and 3.
Experiments

Evaluation
The objective of the experiments is to evaluate if noisy FGSM-based training leads to robust neural networks, and if the SAL further improves this robustness. Additionally, it is investigated if the SAL prohibits neural networks from overfitting to the FGSM attack during the training. This objective was accomplished by training pairs of nearly identical models, the only difference being that the SAL is added before one model as an additional first layer. These models were trained with the noisy FGSM approach and for comparison, also with the RFGSM approach presented by [Wong et al., 2020] . The effective robustness of these model pairs was then evaluated against three different adversarial attacks (PGD, SPSA, FGSM). Whereby the effective robustness of a neural network can be defined as the lowest accuracy against any adversarial attack [Uesato et al., 2018] . Furthermore, to increase the validity of the experiments, we train each model with five repeats of two-fold cross-validation as proposed by [Dietterich, 1998] and apply the correct resampled t-test introduced by [Nadeau and Bengio, 2000] , to evaluate if the robustness differences of the model pairs are significant (α = 0.003). Nevertheless, the adversarial robustness of a model can currently not be ensured for every possible attack. There might be optimization strategies that lead to stronger adversaries and break the models. The SAL is released alongside this paper to encourage other researchers to evaluate our approach independently. Besides, we evaluate if the proposed method can also be used as a regularization technique. Since the SAL is adding noise to the input by sampling with independently trained variances for every pixel value, it can be regarded as a form of learnable data augmentation. We evaluated the regularization properties of the SAL for three different ResNet-v2 architectures [He et al., 2016] with an increasing amount of parameters. In addition to the clean accuracy of the model, the accuracy of noisy and adversarial examples is reported. For this experiment, the predefined training and test sets of CIFAR100 were used, and the test accuracy was evaluated for a single training run due to time constraints.
Data
Four different datasets were used to evaluate the adversarial robustness of the different models (MNIST [LeCun et al., 1998 ], Fashion-MNIST [Xiao et al., 2017], CIFAR10, CI-FAR100 [Krizhevsky, 2009] ). All the datasets contain images, where the goal is to classify the images according to their labels. The MNIST dataset is mainly considered a toy datasets since a trivial classifier such as K-Nearest-Neighbour (KNN) can achieve 95% accuracy on the clean dataset [Le-Cun et al., 1998 ]. However, no adversarial robust neural network architecture has been proposed for the MNIST dataset yet. Thus, MNIST can be considered a non-trivial example in the adversarial case [Schott et al., 2019] . Similar arguments can be made for Fashion-MNIST, where the classification task is slightly more complicated, as it contains more intricate patterns. In order to show that the approach generalized also to even more complicated classification tasks, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 are additionally included in the experiments. Data from the CIFAR datasets were normalized between zero and one. For testing the regularization properties of the SAL, we use only the CIFAR100 dataset, since it has the highest complexity of the described datasets.
Adversarial Attack Parameters
White-box attacks lead to stronger adversarial examples and are, in consequence, applied in preference to black-box attacks. Since the transferability of black-box attacks can not be guaranteed, we test the models against gradient obfuscation with the gradient-free SPSA attack. All attacks are untargeted and are considered successful if the input is misclassified. We use the often-used l ∞ norm to restrict the magnitude of the adversarial attacks in all experiments. The adversarial perturbation budget was chosen to be 0.3 for MNIST and 0.03 for CIFAR according to prior experiments in the literature [Madry et al., 2018] . We used 50 gradient steps for the PGD attack and ensured that we could reach every point in the -ball with a step size of 2 · /50. One hundred steps were used for the SPSA attack.
Model and Training Parameters
We trained four different models in our experiments. Firstly, a small CNN architecture, consisting of two convolutions followed by a fully-connected layer suitable for the simpler MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets. In addition, three different residual models were used for the more complicated CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. Residual models like ResNet52 [He et al., 2016] , have been used for adversarial benchmarks in prior literature [Madry et al., 2018] , and hence provide a robust baseline for comparison. A cyclic learning rate [Smith, 2017] was used together with the ADAM optimizer (β 1 = 0.9, β 2 = 0.999) [Kingma and Ba, 2014] to achieve a faster training time. The learning rate bounds were estimated by linearly increasing the learning rate of each individual network for a few epochs, as suggested by [Smith, 2017] . All models were optimized to an overfitting point, and the checkpoint with the lowest adversarial validation loss was chosen for testing. The batch size was kept at 100 for all experiments.
Results
The results of the experiments described in Section 6.1 are reported below. In the first part, the impact of noisy FGSM training and the SAL on the adversarial robustness of neural networks is presented. In the second part, the regularization properties of the SAL whilst training on clean data are shown. Table 1 : Accuracy mean and standard deviation in percent for various configurations, with and without the stochastic augmentation layer as the first layer. Sub-tables (a) and (b) show RFGSM training and FGSM training with noise injection, respectively. The adversarial attacks were bounded by = 0.3 for the MNIST datasets and = 0.03 for CIFAR datasets. Data from CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 are normalized between zero and one. The effective adversarial robustness of a model (lowest accuracy against any of the attack) is shown with a bold font in (a) and (b). Significant differences (α = 0.003) between the effective robustness with and without the SAL are highlighted with a star (*). Adversarial robustness without the SAL is in some cases achieved through gradient obfuscation as seen by the low robustness against SPSA attacks.
Adversarial Robustness
The evaluation of the adversarial robustness for all configurations is given in Table 1 . Table 1a presents RFGSM adversarial training, where the starting point is randomly initialized according to [Wong et al., 2020] . Our approach, given in Table 1b , uses a standard implementation of FGSM but adds uniform noise in the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation to the input. Within each approach, the effect of adding the SAL as a front-end to a model is analyzed. For both approaches, the sole training with RFGSM or noisy FGSM resulted in overfitting to the FGSM attack for the Fashion-MNIST dataset. This can be exploited by gradient-free attacks such as SPSA, resulting in no real adversarial robustness. In some cases, this effect could also be observed for models trained on the MNIST dataset, which can be seen by the high standard deviation of the mean SPSA accuracy. Networks, which included the SAL were not affected by overfitting. Furthermore, higher effective adversarial robustness was achieved in all cases with the SAL, with significant differences in seven out of ten cases. The clean accuracies of the models were slightly higher without the SAL in nearly all experiments. Significant differences between the clean accuracies of the model pairs were not reported, as the focus of this paper is set on adversarial robustness. The two FGSM training procedures achieved comparable results. In an additional experiment, we compared the robustness achieved with PGD training by [Madry et al., 2018] (46% accuracy) on the CIFAR10 dataset to our approach and achieved a mean accuracy of 62% over ten runs. For this experiment, we used the same predefined train-test split of the CIFAR10 dataset. Note that their approach used a weaker PGD attack with 20 instead of 50 steps with the same perturbation budget . Figures 1 and 3 exemplify by which manner the adversarial robustness is improved. Models trained with the SAL learn weights that lead to small variances in foreground regions and high variances in background regions. Thus, effectively blocking adversarial attacks that target image regions that should be irrelevant for the classification. Initial experiments conducted on MNIST, where the SAL was used not only before the first layer but also multiple times throughout the network, gave similar results. Since using the SAL only at the beginning of the neural network has the lowest computational complexity, only results following this approach were reported.
Regularization
The regularization properties of the SAL are summarized in the table 2. With clean and noisy training data, the performance of all models was improved by the SAL. Models trained with clean training data showed hardly any effective adversarial robustness. The results indicate that the models have noisy or uninformative gradient information since the SPSA attack showed the lowest accuracy. With noisy training data, the best models with and without the SAL achieved 23% and 8% adversarial accuracy, respectively. The SAL learned similar weights when trained on clean data compared to adversarial data.
Discussion
With adversarial training, there exists an established method to make neural networks more robust against adversarial attacks. Nevertheless, this approach has been limited by the additional computational effort involved in training with strong adversarial attacks like PGD. We show that training with FGSM and additional input noise can lead to similar robustness. Depending on the step count of the PGD attack, this can reduce the training time by orders of magnitude. We did not observe a considerable difference between the performance of our approach and the FGSM-based training proposed by [Wong et al., 2020] . Nevertheless, our method has the benefit that it works with a standard implementation of the FGSM attack and is, therefore, easier to implement. However, both methods can lead to drastic overfitting to the FGSM attack. This results in no adversarial robustness against gradient-free methods such as SPSA. We proposed a solution to this problem with the SAL and achieved significantly higher adversarial robustness by using the SAL as a front-end of our neural networks. We argue that the additional resampling of the input during training time increases the variety of the input and makes the network less likely to overfit. Furthermore, during the inference time of the network, the random resampling makes it harder for the attacker to construct an adversarial sample since the precise outcome of the network is not known in advance.
Additional experiments with different model sizes showed that the SAL can also be used as a regularization technique. Contrary to Variational Autoencoders, no Kullback-Leibler-Divergence loss is used to push the variances computed by the SAL in a certain direction. Intuitively, the SAL could learn high negative weights and biases for all features, which would lead to a zero variance in the output. As a result, the SAL would not change its inputs by the resampling step, and the network would be able to minimize the training loss. We argue that most pixels in an image do not contribute to the classification. Thus, only small gradients are obtained for the corresponding features in the SAL, and their value remains relatively unchanged. The regions where the object of interest is located contribute primarily to the classification loss and produce larger gradient values. We observe this behavior in our experiments, as seen in Figures 1 and 3 . In return, the network must focus on the crucial aspects of each image, since background information is partially lost by noise generated as a result of the resampling process.
Yet, the weights of the SAL in Figures 1 and 3 are determined by the fact that the objects of interest are located in the middle of the image. This leads to low variances in the center of the image. Consequently, the SAL would be rendered ineffective if the relative position of an object were to change. That said, in many datasets, such as the ones used in this paper or the popular imagenet dataset, the objects of interest are found in the center of the image. Further, the problem could be solved by a more complicated calculation of the variance before sampling. One possible approach would be to calculate the variance with another neural network. This way, the context of the pixels could be taken into account, whereas the current method only considered the relative position of the pixels. Our experiments indicate that our approach enables stable FGSM-based adversarial training, and can even outperform PGD-based training. We assume that the increase in performance and stability will make it easier to deploy robust neural networks in industry applications. Furthermore, we hope that researchers who rely on adversarial training will be able to use the increased performance of our method to accelerate their research.
